Capital incentive policies in the age of cloud computing : an empirical case study by Andres, Raphaela et al.
DISCUSSION 
PAPER
/ /  R A P H A E L A  A N D R E S ,  T I M O T H Y  D E S T E F A N O , 
T H O M A S  N I E B E L ,  A N D  S T E F F E N  V I E T E
/ /  N O . 2 0 - 0 3 6  |  0 8 / 2 0 2 0
Capital Incentive Policies in 
the Age of Cloud Computing:  
An Empirical Case Study
Capital incentive policies in the age of cloud computing: an
empirical case study





The following paper assesses whether current policy environments are appropriate for the
emergence of cloud computing technology. In particular, this research uses firm-level data for
Germany and the UK to examine the impact of capital incentive programmes (a common
policy present in most OECD countries) on cloud adoption. The design for many of these
policies target investments in physical capital while excluding digital services like the cloud.
Firms view digital investments and digital services as substitutes, therefore narrowly defined
incentive programmes may actually discourage the use of emerging tools like cloud computing,
which are found to enable the growth and performance of young entrants. Overall, the results
find that while capital incentive policies encourage firm investments in ICT and other forms of
capital, they actually reduce the probability of cloud adoption. Policy makers may therefore
need to reconsider the design of capital incentive programmes within their jurisdictions.
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1 Introduction
Over the last 10 years, a fundamental shift has occurred in the manner with which firms
access digital technology. In the past, the acquisition of information and communication
technologies (ICTs) required businesses to make considerable upfront sunk investments in hardware
infrastructure and software in order to establish and maintain IT departments. Recently however,
there has been a change in the nature of ICT use, where firms are increasingly acquiring their
storage, processing and software needs as a service through what is typically referred to as “cloud
computing” (Van Ark, 2016; OECD, 2015). Third party IT providers offer such services “on
demand” or through “pay as you go” subscriptions. As a result, firms no longer need to invest
and own digital technologies, thereby avoiding many of the sunk costs previously associated with
ICT use, while at the same time reducing their reliance on centralised IT departments (OECD,
2015; OECD, 2014).
The growth in this new way of accessing IT has been rapid. Amazon Web Services first introduced
cloud in 2006 and two years later released more advanced cloud services allowing for greater
capacity in storage and processing power. From around 2010, more cloud providers entered the
market resulting in increased competition and considerable declines in the price of cloud services
(Barr, 2009a; Barr, 2009b). The decline in prices were followed by a dramatic increase in the
adoption of cloud computing by businesses. For example, between 2009-2017 cloud expenditures
grew 4.5 times faster than traditional IT investment expenditure (Lesser, 2017). By 2016, 30% of
firms used cloud across the OECD, with expenditure on cloud services representing 25% of firms’
IT budgets (Eurostat, 2018; Deloitte, 2017). Moreover, global expenditures of cloud services are
expected to reach USD 173 billion by 2026 (Columbus, 2016).
The diffusion of cloud coincides with the trend of firms becoming increasingly more reliant on
intangible assets such as data, R&D, branding and less on tangible assets such as machines,
equipment, factories (Corrado & Hulten, 2010; Haskel & Westlake, 2017). Cloud is expected to
further enable the use of intangibles, in particular data, since it is a less expensive and a more
flexible substitute for traditional storage and processing hardware technologies. This has ushered
in a new age of business models based on data collection and analysis, referred to as big data
(McKinsey, 2011; Niebel, Rasel, & Viete, 2019). This shift towards data based business models
is indeed reflected in the fact that the accumulated sum of globally stored data will increase
from 33 zettabytes in 2018 to 175 zettabytes by 2025, representing an annual growth rate of 27
percent. Moreover, most of this data will be stored in the cloud (IDC, 2018). Looking forward,
the diffusion of cloud will further facilitate emerging technologies including artificial intelligence,
machine learning and other predictive technologies (Columbus, 2018).
On the one hand, policy makers are interested in fostering the diffusion of emerging technologies
like cloud. However, there is good reason to believe that some policies currently in place across
OECD economies may actually be discouraging cloud use. Notably, programmes that are narrowly
targeted towards encouraging investment in physical capital including investments in digital
technology. Such policies are therefore likely to lower the marginal cost of eligible investments,
incentivizing firms to adopt one type of technology versus another. Microeconomic investment
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theory for example purports that firms make capital investments so as to adjust to an optimal
level of capital, contingent upon optimal output and cost of capital. Therefore, a capital incentive
scheme lowers the user cost of capital for eligible businesses, incentivizing new investment. As
such, Criscuolo et al. (2019) show that a regionally targeted investment subsidy is successful in
raising capital investments and employment in the UK. Since firms view cloud services and ICT
investments as substitutes, policies, which specifically target capital investments are likely to
discourage the use of cloud services. It is important to note that many of these policies targeting
traditional capital investments require firms to pay the government back for support received if
the business subsequently sells the asset (OECD, 2019). This may act as a barrier for a firm’s
ability to experiment and adjust, particularly for entrants and those located in volatile sectors.
There are a number of different capital incentive policies currently present across OECD economies,
targeted towards promoting the digital transformation of firms. However, such programmes
often incentivise investments rather than the procurement of digital services. These include
tax allowances, subsidies and targeted grants geared towards investments in digital and/or
more general capital investments (OECD, 2019). Italy and the UK for example have used
tax allowances to encourage the adoption of particular types of capital and/or “Industry 4.0”
technologies (Menon, DeStefano, Manaresi, Soggia, & Santoleri, 2018; Maffini, Xing, & Devereux,
2019; Spengel, et al., 2015). In Germany, examples are the “Digital Now - Investment Promotion
for SMEs”, an investment grant for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) currently planned by
the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, or the “ERP-digitalisation loan” by the
government-owned development bank (KfW). One potential reason why countries use capital
incentive policies is that investments are easy to measure and demonstrate policy success while
cloud use is difficult to see by the policy maker or even by offices of national statistics; cloud use
is typically listed as an operating expense on firm balance sheets. To our knowledge, few policies
target cloud use directly with the exception of a programme introduced in Spain, which provides
EUR 40 million in funds to promote cloud computing services for SMEs (OECD, 2019).
The objective of this paper is to understand the extent to which capital incentive programmes
affect the adoption of cloud services. This paper will focus on two distinct policies rolled
out separately in the UK and Germany known as the Annual Investment Allowance (AIA),
which is a tax allowance policy and the “Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen
Wirtschaftsstruktur” (GRW),1 which is an investment grant scheme.2 The analysis relies on novel
firm-level data and is the first study to our knowledge, which examines cloud adoption at the
firm level for multiple countries.34 The reliance on cross-country firm-level data is particularly
useful as it enables one to control for a host of unobservable characteristics, which may also be
linked to cloud adoption, allowing for more robust estimation. The use of micro cross-country
data also enables the identification of firm heterogeneity and provides insights as to whether or
not the estimation of the effects of a policy is externally valid across different regions. One of
1 “Joint task for the improvement of the regional economic structure” in English.
2 The results in this paper are based on analysis from Andres et al. (2019) and DeStefano et al. (2019).
3 There are a few paper which assess the determinants and performance effects of cloud adoption at the industry
level (Gal et al., 2019; Andrews et al., 2018).
4 Firm-level analysis has been undertake for individual countries including Ohnemus & Niebel (2016) and DeStefano
et al. (2019)
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the drawbacks however is that we are unable to pool the two data sets since they can only be
accessed from secure data labs within their respective countries.
The adoption of cloud is taking place quite rapidly, however at considerably different rates across
countries. The two countries assessed in this study, Germany and the UK, exhibit increases
in adoption over the sample period, however as of 2018, 22.4% of firms in Germany adopted
cloud versus 41.9% in the UK (see Figure 1).5 This raises the question whether policy settings
in different countries may be playing a role in determining the rate of adoption. One possible
explanation may be that some policy environments are targeted more towards encouraging
traditional ICT investments rather than digital services, such as capital incentive programmes
(OECD, 2019). Another explanation may be the quality and availability of fast broadband, as
it is a technological prerequisite for cloud use (DeStefano, Kneller, & Timmis, 2019). In fact,
for many OECD countries the provision of higher quality broadband is a key pillar in their
overall digital strategy (OECD, 2015). Other barriers to adoption may include general reluctance
by firms to store information with a third party provider, particularly those with considerable
intellectual property (OECD, 2014).



















Note: This figure shows the percentage of firms employing 10 or more persons, which use cloud computing in
the years 2014, 2016 and 2018 in Germany (blue) and the UK (red).
Source: Eurostat (2018b).
Countries have long been interested in the degree with which firms adopt digital technology.
This is motivated by the empirical findings that ICTs are found to influence the nature of
production and enhance economic performance. For example, a substantial body of research
demonstrates that ICT enables firm productivity, reduces production time, increases innovation
and specialization, improves accuracy and enables firms to replicate processes faster (Pilat, Lee,
5 Note, the purpose of this paper is not to assess reasons for the differences in adoption between these two countries
but to understand whether policies in place influence cloud use for firms in each country respectively.
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& van Ark, 2003; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, & Hitt, 2002; Hubbard, 2003; Bartel, Ichniowski, &
Shaw, 2007; Brynjolfsson, McAfee, Sorell, & Zhu, 2008). Moreover, the usage of digital technology
not only increases firm performance but can also influence differences in aggregate productivity
between countries. A seminal paper by van Ark, O’Mahony and Timmer (2008) for example,
finds that the productivity gap between Europe and the US was partly explained by the slower
arrival of the knowledge economy to Europe. Not only did the US invest in more IT but their
firms were able to achieve greater multifactor productivity growth from these investments.
Similarly, understanding what drives cloud adoption is particularly important to policy makers
because unlike previous ICTs, cloud computing is more accessible to small young firms, potentially
levelling the playing field between firms. Bloom and Pierri (2018) suggests that cloud computing
is “democratized computing” enabling the access of digital tools to the masses. Their results
demonstrate that the adoption of cloud is occurring relatively earlier and more comprehensively
by young and small entities than for previous ICTs (like E-commerce applications and PCs). Jin
and McElheran (2017) find evidence that ICT services are statistically linked to higher survival
and growth among young plants. Moreover, cloud adoption leads to employment and productivity
growth for young firms and the reorganisation of older firms through closing plants and moving
employment further from the headquarters (DeStefano, Kneller, & Timmis, 2019).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the nature of cloud and the
potential determinants for the adoption of these services. Section 3 introduces the policy context,
data, empirical strategy and results for the capital incentive programmes in the UK and Germany,
respectively. Comparisons between the two programmes will be made in Section 4 followed by
some policy considerations.
2 Understanding cloud and what enables adoption
2.1 What is cloud computing
Until recently, in order for a firm to benefit from digitalisation, significant investments in hardware
and software were required. However, recently, there has been a shift in the nature of ICT
adoption where firms are purchasing digital services (e.g. “cloud” computing) rather than making
such investments themselves (OECD, 2015). In addition, as long as a business has reliable
high-speed broadband, they can access a range of services including data storage and processing,
virtual desktops, software platforms and applications (See Figure 2).
Cloud computing is a service delivered by third party providers which “enables ubiquitous,
convenient on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources
(e.g. networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and
released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction” (Mell & Grance, 2011).
The largest global cloud providers include Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure and Google
Cloud Platform. Together these firms are expected to represent 83 percent of the global market
of cloud services in 2020 (Columbus, 2018). The most commonly referred definition of cloud
computing comes from the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This
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definition lists five essential characteristics, three service models, and a total of four deployment
models which are condensed below.
The five main characteristics of cloud computing are:
• On-demand self-service means that a consumer of cloud services can unilaterally provision
computing capabilities
• Broad network access means that the capabilities are available over the network
• Resource pooling means that the available computing resources can be pooled to serve
multiple consumers
• Rapid elasticity or expansion means that capabilities can be elastically provisioned and
released
• Measured service means that resource usage can be transparently monitored, controlled,
and reported
There are also three different deployment models for cloud computing services:
• Private Cloud means that the cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by a
single organisation but may be owned, managed, and operated by the organisation, a third
party, and it may exist on or off premises
• Public Cloud means that the cloud infrastructure is provisioned for open use by the general
public and may be owned, managed, and operated by a business, academic, or government
organisation and exclusively exists on the premises of the cloud provider
• Hybrid cloud means that a combination of private and public cloud services is used and
data and application portability is given
The measure of cloud computing used in this paper refers to whether a firm has bought any
cloud computing services delivered from servers of providers over the internet. Thus the measure
used in this research covers all public cloud services and private cloud services delivered from
external service providers. In addition, the data also contain information on the specific type of
cloud service the firm uses, such as data storage and processing, a software platform, and/or
software applications. Unfortunately, within our data we cannot distinguish different deployment
modes (such as private, public and hybrid cloud).
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Figure 2: What is the cloud?
Source: thinkIT solutions.6
2.2 Expected benefits from cloud
Cloud computing is perceived to lower entry barriers, allowing the entry of new firms, creating
new employment opportunities and enhanced competition, particularly for firms that previously
used fixed ICTs intensively (OECD, 2015; Etro, 2009). Some optimistic estimates suggest that
between 2008 and 2020, cloud could positively impact employment by creating 1.6 million jobs
and enabling the start-up of 303,000 new businesses between 2015 and 2020 in the EU (European
Commission, 2017). The report concludes that in the next five years cloud computing may
contribute an additional EUR 449 billion of revenue to GDP in the EU alone.
Increased reliance on the cloud may also increase the impact of early-stage investment. In the
past, a considerable amount of equity investment were used to acquire IT equipment, however
greater use of the cloud may incentivise investors to spread smaller amounts of equity to more
firms (Ewens, Nanda, & Rhodes-Kropf, 2018). Renting hardware and software is also expected
to allow businesses to allocate more resources to essential areas of firm competitiveness including
product and processes innovation, distribution networks, marketing and so on (OECD, 2015;
Columbus, 2013).
Cloud is believed to allow firms to scale their operations very quickly without the need for
upfront investments and facilitate new business models, “Scale without mass”. Negating the
need for quasi-irreversible investments in hardware, cloud can allow for greater flexibility and
experimentation in the face of uncertainty (Jin & McElheran, 2017). Cloud not only makes the
firm itself more flexible, it also allows for potential employment reallocation throughout the firm
by eliminating the need for fixed PCs to be connected to the internal hardware and software




space are typically underutilised by businesses, increased usage of the cloud is also anticipated to
enhance energy efficiency and reduce firm utility costs (Masanet et al., 2013).
To date there is limited empirical studies on the economic implications of cloud. One exception
is DeStefano, Kneller, & Timmis (2019) which finds that cloud leads to the growth of young
firms in terms of employment (with some evidence of productivity gains), but these firms become
more concentrated in fewer plants. For older firms, cloud does not result in scale or productivity
growth, but instead in more geographically disperse activities by closing plants and moving
employment further from the headquarters.
2.3 Determinants of cloud
2.3.1 Firm characteristics
While there are only a few studies assessing the effects of firm characteristics on cloud use, much
of the empirical evidence is consistent with what is found for ICT investment. For example the
propensity for firm-level cloud adoption is negatively linked with firm age and positively linked
with firm size (DeStefano, Kneller, & Timmis, 2019; Ohnemus & Niebel, 2016; Oliveira, Thomas,
& Espadanal, 2014).7 The availability of highly skilled workers tends to increase the likelihood
of adapting cloud technologies (Bloom & Pierri, 2017) while advanced management practices is
positively related to cloud adoption (Andrews, Nicoletti, & Timiliotis, 2018).8
2.3.2 Market characteristics
To date there are limited studies on the effects of various market environments on cloud adoption
and none which assess capital incentive policies. One exception is Andrews, Nicoletti & Timiliotis
(2018), which examines the impact of traditional policies indictors (long been used in the literature
to assess of ICT investments) on cloud adoption at the industry level. The policies include
barriers to entry and exit, insolvency regimes, digital trade restrictiveness, labour market rigidities,
venture capital, and tax incentive for R&D. Consistent with that is found for ICT adoption more
generally, rigidities to entry, exit, employment production legislation and insolvency regimes are
linked with a lower likelihood of cloud adoption. Their analysis also finds that broad indicators
on R&D tax incentives are linked to a positive likelihood of cloud adoption.
2.3.3 Other factors
Another factor, which may influence the adoption of cloud is the availability of fibre broadband.
The growth of cloud services is a phenomenon that has gone hand-in-hand with the rollout of
high-speed fibre broadband. A stable, high-speed broadband connection is required to allow the
large flows of data between the cloud service providers and users, and is therefore a technological
prerequisite for cloud adoption (ITU, 2017). Recent empirical evidence demonstrates that fibre
7 Both results are in line with previous studies on ICT adoption, see Haller & Siedschlag (2011). However adoption
of cloud is occurring relatively earlier and more comprehensively by small firms than for previous ICT investments
such as E-commerce applications, PCs and so on (Bloom & Pierri, 2017).
8 This is again in line with the literature on general ICT adoption for skilled workers (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, &
Hitt, 2002; Haller & Siedschlag, 2011) and management (Bloom, Sadun, & Reenen, 2012).
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broadband and its speed are important determinants for cloud adoption (DeStefano, Kneller,
& Timmis, 2019). The extent to which this results holds for other countries will be tested in
Germany within the paper.
3 Policy implications in the UK and Germany
The following section introduces the policies, empirical strategies, data used and results in the
UK and Germany respectively. For the UK, the policy assessed is a capital incentive programme
known as the Annual Investment Allowance (AIA), which provided tax incentives to eligible
firms towards investments in physical capital. In Germany, the investment policy analysed is the
Joint Task for the Improvement of the Regional Economic Structure (GRW) programme. This
framework provides investment grants to firms located in particular regions and funds are differed
by firm size. Traditionally, one would pool data and use consistent econometric frameworks for
the two countries and assess the effect and the heterogeneity of the policies. Pooling the data
sets, is not possible in this case because the data cannot be taken out of their respective Offices
of National Statistics and combine elsewhere. Moreover, given that the policies in Germany and
the UK are distinctly different (qualification into the AIA is based on total investments while
qualification in Germany is based on regions and firm size), consistent empirical approaches
would not be appropriate. As such, the paper uses slightly different empirical frameworks that
will be explained below. The benefit of the study however is that it allows one to assess whether
similar policies (capital incentive programmes) located in different jurisdictions thus helping to
establish external validity regarding the effects of these programmes on cloud adoption.
3.1 The Annual Investment Allowance in the UK
The AIA was introduced in the UK for the financial year 2008-2009, with the objective of
stimulating business invest in new forms of (physical) capital and induce economic growth
(HMRC, 2018). The programme allowed firms to deduct capital investment during the year, up to
the AIA ceiling, from their (pre-tax) profits. As we discuss further below, this ceiling has shifted
upwards and downwards a number of times over the course of its implementation (see Table 1).
It is important to note that the allowance is not specific to digital capital investment, but covered
all long-term equipment used to produce or sell products – termed “plant and machinery” –
which also includes ICT capital.9 At the onset, this was seen as a move away from a policy based
on size and/or legal form eligibility linked incentive for investment, towards one targeting the
activity to be encouraged, in this case capital investment (Freedman & Crawford, 2008).
It is reasonable to assume physical ICT capital investment and cloud adoption to react very
differently to capital incentives. Firms make capital investments so as to modify to an optimal
level of capital, contingent upon optimal output and cost of capital. An increase in the AIA
investment ceiling lowers the user cost of capital for some businesses, incentivizing new investment.
Estimates suggest that the 2010 increase in the AIA threshold from £50,000 to £100,000 decreased
user cost of capital for an additional £1 investment between these two figures by 28 percent (if
9 The policy however does not cover intangible capital such as software.
8
financed by earnings and equity) and 31 percent (if financed with debt) (Harper & Liu, 2013).
As such, rises in the allowance threshold over the period should further increase the incentive to
invest in physical ICT capital as opposed to cloud services.
These policy changes provide an ideal setting for the assessment of its impact on firms decision
to invest in ICT capital or adoption cloud computing. The empirical framework of this paper
uses the four periods when AIA increased considerably, the years ending in 2009, 2011, 2014
and 2015. Changes in the threshold do not appear to occur in a predicative manner lowering
concerns about potential anticipation effects by firms.
Table 1: Annual Investment Allowance ceiling, 2008 to 2015
Financial year (ending 31st March) Annual Allowance threshold
2008 and earlier -
2009 - 2010 £50,000




Note: *Pro rata as changed mid-year. The financial year April 2011-March 2012 had 9 months of an allowance of
£25,000 and 3 months of £250,000, equal to £81,250 pro-rata for the year. The financial year April 2014 – March
2015 had 9 months of £500,000 allowance and 3 months of £200,000, which equals £425,000 for the year. All
other allowances coincide with complete financial years.
Source: HMRC (2018).
It is important to mention the existence of other policies during our sample period, which may
bias the results. The UK did have an ICT capital specific incentive for small firms, but this
was only in place from 1st April 2000 to 31st March 2004 (Gaggl & Wright, 2017). Another
policy is the First Year Allowance, which existed before our sample period and ended in 2008,
re-emerging for one year in 2010. The policy provided tax allowances for capital investment to
firms with revenue less than £22.8 million. As a robustness test, we exclude firms in our sample
with revenue below this threshold.
3.1.1 Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy exploits changes in the thresholds of the AIA to identify treated firms for
whom the marginal incentives to invest (in capital) decreased. We compare these firms against
those whose lagged investment would remain either above or below the AIA threshold in both
periods, and thus for whom there would be no change in their marginal incentives. E.g., a firm
with investment of £25,000 in 2010 would be beneath the AIA ceiling in both 2010 (£50,000) and
2011 (£100,000). Similarly, a firm with investment of £200,000 in 2010 would be above the AIA
ceiling in both 2010 and 2011. For these firms that remain above or below the AIA ceiling in both
years, there is no change in their marginal investment incentives. We examine how cloud and
ICT capital investment decisions differ for the set of firms whose marginal investment incentives
have changed, compared to those that remain above or below the AIA allowance. In particular,
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we look at the use of cloud along with total investment, IT acquisition and hardware acquisition.
In our data, cloud adoption is binary while investments are represented as continuous variables.
Out of a concern for anticipation effects into the policy we use their total investment in machinery
and equipment two and three years earlier for this assessment. In particular, the baseline results
use averages across lagged investment in periods t-2 and t-3 to identify treated firms. As a
robustness test the paper also uses lags rather than averages.
The paper uses a difference-in-differences regression to estimate the effect of the changes in
AIA allowances on physical ICT capital investment and purchase of cloud technologies (see
Equation (1)).
yit = α+ βZit + FEi + FEt + χit + εit (1)
yit represents either ICT investment or cloud adoption of firm i in period t. Zit identifies the
treatment group and thus is equal to one for the periods post-AIA reform, for the firms whose
average lagged investment is lower than the post-reform AIA threshold, but greater than the
pre-reform threshold. The parameter of interest β measures the intention to treat effect.
The regressions include firm and year fixed effects, thus the regressions are capturing within firm
effects. This also enables the econometrician to control for unobserved firm characteristics and
trends, signified by FEi and FEt, respectively. The regressions also contain a number of control
variables, including lagged investments, age, multi-plant, foreign ownership represented by χit.
The constant is α and εit is an error term.
It is important to note that firms’ adoption of cloud technologies are only observed in three
years, 2008, 2013 and 2015. As a result, the period over which treatment occurs differs according
to the AIA reform under consideration. Thus, for the introduction of the AIA policy we observe
cloud adoption by treated and control firms between 5 and 7 years later, whereas for the 2011
reform we observe outcomes 2 and 4 years later. Therefore, when pooling the AIA reforms into a
single regression we capture a mix of short- and medium-run outcomes.
3.1.2 UK data
The data for the UK come from three sources and is held by the Office for National Statistics
(ONS). Information on cloud adoption and the use of big-data analytics is collected by the
E-commerce Survey. Importantly the survey is administered by Eurostat, thus resulting in
consistency in survey questions regarding technology adoption between EU countries overtime.
The E-commerce Survey contains 7 different types of cloud services including, data, storage,
processing, email, office software, finance software, customer relationship management software
(CRM). “Cloud data” refers to the hosting the business’ databases on the cloud, “cloud storage”
reflects the storage of files on the cloud and “cloud processing” refers to the using cloud computing
capacity to run the business’ own software. From these various measures, we construct a single
overall measure of cloud adoption (of any type) by the firm.10
10The paper also explores heterogeneity in the policies on the various types of cloud services listed above.
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The big data variable is a binary measure equal to 1 if the enterprise is analysing big data
either via the enterprise’s own data collected with smart devices or sensors, data gathered from
geolocation data from the use of portable devices, generated from social media, and/or data is
collected from other external sources.
Information on the Annual Investment Allowance programme including details regarding the
introduced and changes in the thresholds comes from the UK Tax Authority (HMRC). Data
on lagged total investment in plant and machinery – which is employed to identify treated and
control firms come from the Annual Business Survey. This data set also includes details on ICT
capital investment as well as information for the firm control variables including age, multi-plant
status and foreign ownership.11
3.1.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 16 in the Appendix contains the summary statistics for the main variables of the UK study.
In the UK sample, on average 38% of firms use cloud, however this varies considerably across
types of cloud technology. 8% of firms use cloud for finance software, but 23% use cloud for
storage. In terms of big data analytics, over the sample period on average 21% have used this.
In terms of how big data is employed, 12% of firms conduct big data analytics only in-house,
only 2% of firms wholly outsource big data analytics to external providers, and 8% conduct a
mixture of in-house analytics and through external providers.12
3.1.4 Empirical results
This section econometrically estimates the effects of changes in the AIA allowance, i.e. the
treatment effect on firm investment in IT capital and cloud adoption. It first presents the baseline
results, which assess the effects of changes in the AIA threshold on firm investment and cloud
adoption decisions.13 Next, the analysis considers the effects of the individual changes in the
AIA policy on firm investment and cloud adoption decisions. Afterwards, this section explores
the extent to which the policy influences the adoption of different types of cloud services as well
as alternative investment decisions such as capital investment in land and buildings, IT intensity,
IT employees and so on. Finally, in order to assess the extent to which cloud diffusion is relevant
for emerging business models, the paper econometrically estimate the effects of cloud on big data
analytics.
3.1.4.1 The effects of the AIA on IT investment decisions
Table 2 illustrates the results on the effects of the AIA policy on firm IT investment and cloud
adoption. In line with Criscuolo et al. (2019), the results show that increases in the AIA
11Differences in data used between the UK and Germany mean that the control variables used in the respective
approaches are slightly different/
12As discussed previously, there are less observations for cloud use and big data (in comparison to investments)
since information on cloud is only available for the years 2013 and 2015, and big data for 2015. In addition
the cloud and big data variables come from the E-commerce survey which surveys fewer firms than the Annual
Business Survey, where investment and other firm characteristics come from.
13As a robustness test we use separately average lagged two-year and three-year of the firm’s investment to
determine the treatment.
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allowance result in increases of total investment, IT capital acquisition and hardware capital
acquisition for the treated firms. The magnitude of the effect of the policy on investment is
sizable. For example the impact of the policy on treated firms (with 2 year average lags) leads
to an increase in total investment, IT acquisition and hardware acquisition by is 64%, 34%
and 31% respectively.14 Secondly, these effects are average over the post-treatment period and
therefore are not necessarily realised in a single year. Thus while substantial; these results are
not implausibly large.
Conversely, AIA resulted in a reduction in the propensity to adopt cloud (again see Table 2).
In particular, increases in the AIA for affected firms results in a reduction in the propensity to
adopt cloud by 12% (with 2-year lags) and 7% (with 3-year lags). The size of the estimated
coefficients here are also somewhat large, given that average cloud adoption in the sample is
38 percent. Thus for treated by the AIA (those that are relatively small), diffusion of cloud is
considerably reduced. Give the consistency in the results when using different lagged averaged
and lagged firm investments to define the treatment, the remained of the paper will use 2-year
average lagged investments for brevity. Addition results are available upon request.
There are two different important take aways from these results. One, firms appear to view ICT
capital investment and cloud ICT services as substitutes – a reduction in the relative price of
ICT capital leads to a substitution away from cloud and towards ICT capital. Common capital
incentive programmes (employed across many OECD member countries) that are used to induce
digital investments appear to be relevant only to traditional physical ICT capital investment.
These policies may inadvertently create disincentives to adopt digital services, such as cloud.
This is relevant as they may be particularly harmful young small firms, given that cloud is well
suited for their digital needs and is found to increase their scale (DeStefano, Kneller, & Timmis,
2019).
14Since the investment outcomes are in logs, the percentage increase in total investment, IT acquisition and
hardware acquisition are calculated as 64% = exp(0.492) – 1, 34% = exp(0.292) – 1 and 31% = exp(0.273) – 1
respectively. Again, our data are not well suited to drawing inferences about implied elasticities.
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Table 2: Capital allowances and investment in ICT capital vs cloud adoption
2 year lagged averages 3 year lagged averages
Variables Investment IT acq Hardware acq Cloud Investment IT acq Hardware acq Cloud
AIA treatment 0.492*** 0.292*** 0.273*** -0.118*** 0.230*** 0.179*** 0.164*** -0.069**
(0.070) (0.052) (0.048) (0.028) (0.065) (0.049) (0.045) (0.029)
Total investment (2 or 3 years) -0.065*** -0.038*** -0.036*** 0.002 -0.115*** -0.076*** -0.069*** 0.006
(0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Foreign ownership -0.042 -0.032 -0.034 0.006 -0.061 -0.012 -0.018 -0.006
(0.066) (0.052) (0.048) (0.030) (0.066) (0.052) (0.048) (0.031)
Multi-plant 0.200** 0.211*** 0.194*** -0.040 0.308*** 0.234*** 0.210*** -0.037
(0.088) (0.072) (0.068) (0.040) (0.090) (0.075) (0.070) (0.040)
Age 0.190* 0.142 0.124 0.013 0.172 0.064 0.048 -0.051
(0.112) (0.098) (0.093) (0.049) (0.107) (0.095) (0.089) (0.056)
Observations 30,337 31,554 31,554 12,293 29,021 30,306 30,306 12,106
RˆSquared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.53 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.54
Note: All regressions include year and firm fixed effects, as well as firm controls of lagged investment, a multi-plant dummy, foreign owned dummy and log age. Columns 1 to
4 use average firm investment (over t-1 and t-2) and columns 5 to 8 use average firm investment (over t-1, t-2 and t-3) to determine the treatment group. Total investment, IT
Acquisitions and Hardware Acquisitions are log values, cloud reflects a binary variable. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***, ** and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 3 examines separately the changes in the AIA threshold in 2009, 2011 and 2014 on firm
investment and adoption decisions.15 To estimate the regressions, we separate observations
according to the treatment year (2009, 2011 or 2014) and thus each cell in the table represents a
unique regression. The results in Table 3, demonstrate strong positive effects from the 2009 and
2011 AIA changes on investment in ICT capital, but no significant impact of the 2014 reform.
This is likely because we have only one-year post-treatment to observe an effect for the 2014
reform.16 In general, the smaller coefficients in later waves of the AIA, reflect the fact that larger
firms are treated in later waves.
On the other hand, the results continue to suggest that changes in the tax allowance reduced
propensity that the firm adopts cloud computing, where this negative effect is apparent from
the 2009, 2011 and 2014 AIA reforms, although only statistically significant for the latter two
reforms. For the 2009 reform the effect is negative but weaker, which may be driven by the
fact that the adoption of cloud is observed in 2013 and 2015, which is a long time after the
reform. Consistent with the results found above, they suggest that physical ICT investment is
substituting for ICT as a service due to this capital tax allowance.
Table 3: Individual changes of capital allowances and investment in ICT capital vs cloud adoption
2 year lagged averages
Variables Total investment IT acquisition Hardware acquisition Cloud
AIA treatment 09 1.690*** 0.845*** 0.765*** -0.058
(0.152) (0.089) (0.080) (0.039)
AIA treatment 11 0.194 0.252** 0.251*** -0.235***
(0.131) (0.101) (0.091) (0.085)
AIA treatment 14 -0.017 -0.140 -0.131 -0.166***
(0.111) (0.086) (0.080) (0.055)
Observations 30,337 31,554 31,554 12,293
RˆSquared 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.84
Note: All regressions include year and firm fixed effects, as well as firm controls of lagged investment, a multi-plant
dummy, foreign owned dummy and log age, not reported for brevity. Regressions use 2 year average lagged firm
investment to determine the treatment group. The estimated treatment effects for each treatment group are
shown individually, for the introduction of the AIA in 2009 and increases in 2011 and 2014. Total investment, IT
Acquisitions and Hardware Acquisitions are log values, cloud reflects a binary variable. Robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Types of cloud
As a next step, we take advantage of additional detail on the various different types of cloud that
15Note that in 2009 the AIA threshold was $50,000, in 2011 the ceiling was £100,000, this was then reduced to
£81,250 in 2013 and increases to £250,000 in 2014 (See Table 1).
16Data on investments is not available after 2014 in the UK business registry.
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firms adopt, which includes software cloud services and hardware cloud services.17 Additionally,
we aggregate the detailed cloud measures according to the two broader cloud measures as defined
by Eurostat which clusters these measures based on their level of complexity (Eurostat, 2018a).18
According to this definition, as shown in Table 4, a firm is flagged as a user of basic cloud
technologies if it uses at least one of email, office software, or file storage via cloud and none of
the more advanced cloud services. On the contrary, a firm is flagged as user of complex cloud
technologies, if it uses at least one of the basic cloud services as well as at least one of the more
advanced cloud services.
Table 4: Cloud by degree of complexity
Use of cloud computing service Basic cloud Complex cloud
Email
Office Software At least one At least one
Storage of Files
Hosting the Enterprise’s database(s)





The results in Table 5 and Table 6 assess the extent to which cloud technologies respond
differently to the AIA allowances, and explore this heterogeneity between hardware and software
services. A priori, one would expect the policy to be negatively linked to cloud services which
represent hardware functions as opposed to software functions, since the programme targets
physical capital investments. Indeed, the policy is negatively correlated with the adoption of
cloud hardware services. The negative effects for example, cloud processing and storage are
perhaps unsurprising, since they likely reflect access to cloud-infrastructure that is likely to at
least partially substitute for servers and other in-house hardware investment. As expected the
relationship between the policy and cloud service software is negative (with the exception of
cloud finance), but considerably weaker and not statistically significant.
Table 7 contains the results, which classify cloud services by their level of complexity. Overall,
we find that the capital incentive allowance is negatively linked to the adoption of the low cloud
technologies but not with the more advanced forms of cloud. One explanation for this may be
due to the fact that the policy is more applicable to smaller firms (given the initial size of the
thresholds). The results however may be worrisome as well if the less complex cloud services
represent an important stepping stone for the adoption of more complex services as firms improve
performance overtime.
17Cloud hardware classification includes Cloud used for storage, hosting databases and processing. Cloud services
refer to CRM, office software, finance software and email.
18See also Gal et al. (2019), or Andrews et al. (2018), who use the same aggregate cloud measure.
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Table 5: Capital allowances and different types of cloud hardware technologies
Variables Cloud hardware Cloud data/storage Cloud storage Cloud data Cloud processing
AIA treatment -0.073** -0.082*** -0.086*** -0.042 -0.037*
(0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.021)
Observations 12,642 12,642 12,642 12,642 12,642
RˆSquared 0.80 0.79 0.77 0.74 0.70
Note: All regressions include year and firm fixed effects, and firm controls including lagged investment, a
multi-plant dummy, foreign owned dummy and log age, not reported for brevity. All regressions use 2 year average
lagged firm investment to determine the treatment group. Each cloud measure reflects a binary variable. Robust
standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
Table 6: Capital allowances and different types of cloud software technologies
Variables Cloud software Cloud CRM Cloud finance Cloud office software Cloud Email
AIA treatment -0.043 -0.014 0.004 -0.021 -0.033
(0.031) (0.024) (0.021) (0.025) (0.029)
Observations 12,642 12,642 12,642 12,642 12,642
RˆSquared 0.80 0.73 0.68 0.74 0.77
Note: All regressions include year and firm fixed effects, and firm controls including lagged investment, a
multi-plant dummy, foreign owned dummy and log age, not reported for brevity. All regressions use 2 year average
lagged firm investment to determine the treatment group. Each cloud measure reflects a binary variable. Robust
standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
Table 7: Capital allowances and investment in overall, low and high technology cloud
Variables Cloud overall Basic Cloud Complex Cloud
AIA treatment -0.111*** -0.035* -0.031
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Observations 12,642 12,642 12,642
RˆSquared 0.85 0.72 0.76
Note: All regressions include year and firm fixed effects, and firm controls including lagged investment, a
multi-plant dummy, foreign owned dummy and log age, not reported for brevity. All regressions use 2 year average
lagged firm investment to determine the treatment group. Each cloud measure reflects a binary variable. Robust
standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
3.1.4.2 Alternative ICT decisions
Table 8 examines the link between the AIA and a host of outcomes for the firm that may also
be linked to the policy including IT Intensity (IT investment per worker), PCs per employee,
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hardware disposals, IT employees, IT services and land and building acquisition. The results
demonstrate that IT intensity of the firm rises as a result of the increase in the AIA, consistent
with the rise of IT investment made by firms. At the same time, there is no evidence that the
number of PCs per employee rises, similar to the disposals of IT equipment or the number of
IT workers (used in the past as a proxy for IT intensity). There is however evidence that land
and building investment rises, consistent with the fact that such forms of capital investment are
eligible under the AIA. There is no statistically significant effect of IT services. Moreover, the
estimated coefficients and the standard errors are small suggesting that this is a well identified
zero effect.
Table 8: Alternative investment and adoption outcomes
Variables IT Land& PCs per Hardware IT IT
intensity Build acq employee disposal employees services
AIA treatment 0.160*** 0.229*** 0.596 -0.058 -0.002 -0.049
(0.06) (0.06) (1.58) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Observations 30,545 33,357 17,273 32,356 9,130 33,442
RˆSquared 0.80 0.77 0.65 0.66 0.55 0.55
Note: All regressions include year and firm fixed effects, and firm controls including lagged investment, a
multi-plant dummy, foreign owned dummy and log age, not reported for brevity. All regressions use 2 year average
lagged firm investment to determine the treatment group. IT intensity if IT acquisitions per employee. PC per
employee reflects the share of computers per employee. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
3.1.4.3 Cloud diffusion and big data analytics (BDA)
The results of the prior section suggest that AIA capital incentives are discouraging the adoption
of cloud computing. Barriers to cloud adoption may also impact the diffusion of new business
models, including the use of big data analytics. Cloud is expected to promote the use of big
data given that it provides less expensive and more flexible methods for storage and processing
information (McKinsey, 2011; Niebel, Rasel, & Viete, 2019). As a result, this section examines
whether this impacts the diffusion of big data analytics.
We estimate the impact on big data in a simple OLS framework including firm and year fixed effects
along with the sample control variables used throughout. The results in Table 9 demonstrate
a positive and significant link between cloud use and the adoption of big data analytics. In
addition, the results find that cloud use increases the propensity to adopt internal, external and
internal and external big data techniques simultaneously. While it is important to interpret the
naïve OLS results with caution due to the potential presence of endogeneity bias, the results do
suggest these two factors go hand in hand.
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Table 9: The effects of cloud adoption on big data analytics (BDA)
2 year lags
Overall Internal-only External-only External and internal
BDA BDA BDA BDA
Cloud 0.183*** 0.069*** 0.025** 0.089***
(0.029) (0.025) (0.010) (0.020)
Observations 10,521 10,521 10,521 10,521
RˆSquared 0.47 0.29 0.05 0.20
Note: All regressions include year and firm fixed effects, and firm controls including lagged investment, a
multi-plant dummy, foreign owned dummy and log age, not reported for brevity. Cloud and big data measures
reflect a binary variable. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. ***, ** and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
3.2 Joint task for the improvement of the regional economic structure in
Germany
We now move on to the second empirical case study, which assesses the relation between public
investment incentives and cloud adoption, exploiting variation in access to regionally targeted
investment grants in Germany. As mentioned previously, the analysis here uses consistent
information on cloud adoption for a different policy context in Germany. The benefits of
conducting econometric analysis with firm-level micro data for multiple countries in different
settings allows one to assess the external validity of our findings and underlines the relevance of
the phenomenon under study.
Traditionally, public financial support in Germany is directed towards rewarding investments,
often times through grants or loans. As shown in Figure 3, grants are the most important
policy incentive for digitisation projects in the German information sector: If firms applied for
investment support, 60% of the firms indicated that they applied for receiving an investment
grant. Other policy incentives, such as consulting vouchers, subsidized loans or tax incentives,
are by far less prevalent.
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Note: Share of firms among those which applied for support for digitisation projects.
Source: ZEW Economic survey of the information sector (2019).
Given the relative importance of investment grants compared to other investment incentives
in Germany, our study focuses on the impact of the primary national programme for non-
repayable investment grants - the “Joint task for the improvement of the regional economic
structure” (GRW). One of the project’s deliberate goals is to support private businesses in
economically lagging regions through funds for physical capital investment projects for expansion
and diversification of production or for fundamental changes to the production process. A second
objective of GRW is the support of public infrastructure, which made up 30% of all grants
between 1995 and 2014 (GRW, 2016).19 Targeted regions eligible for funding and the maximum
shares of the investment costs which can be funded were newly defined in 2014. Eligible regions
are chosen based on an evaluation of various indicators (unemployment, gross salaries, expected
employment, infrastructure). The German Federal States are responsible for implementing GRW,
i.e. they decide about the allocation of funds to eligible projects (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014).
Funding is available for specific investment projects and eligible costs are capital expenditures or
personnel costs.20 Maximum funding rates of the investment costs vary regionally and by firm
size.
Funds are available in the whole of Eastern Germany and with lower funding rates in various
regions in West Germany. Maximum funding intensities, i.e. the shares of the total investment
costs, which can get funded, were assigned based on the region’s previous economic output
(Figure 4). The regional variation in eligibility for public funding within the scope of the GRW at
the municipal level will be used in this paper to investigate the relation between public investment
19We note that infrastructure funds in the GRW framework should either be neutral towards the firms’ decision
between investment in ICT assets versus acquisition of ICT services, or, in case they are used for broadband
infrastructure, they should indirectly incentivise cloud adoption. This would downward bias potential negative
effects of investment incentives on cloud adoption.
20Figure 5 in the Appendix provides information on the development of GRW cases and funding over time.
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incentives and firms’ use of cloud computing and other IT-assets.
Figure 4: GRW 2014 regions
Note: This figure shows the distribution of the maximum funding rates of the GRW as determined by location
and firm size over the firms in the sample. For the empirical analysis, the maximum funding of 200.000 € for large
enterprises (compare to Table 10) is coded as an incentive rate of 5%.
Source: Authors’ illustration based on BAFA (Federal Office of Economic Affairs and Export Control, 2019).
Figure 4 plots the GRW regional aid map, which came into effect in mid-2014. The former GRW
regions were in place between 2007 and 2013 (see Figure 7 and Figure 8 in the Appendix). While
location determines whether a firm has access to GRW funding, the map additionally illustrates
variation in the maximum funding rates across regions and by firm’s SME status. Whereas the
whole of Eastern Germany has access to GRW funding, in Western Germany only selected regions
are addressed by GRW. The highest funding rates apply to regions at the border to Poland. Since
GRW funding is targeted towards economically weaker regions and is implemented by the federal
states, we need to take account for confounding regional characteristics in our empirical analysis.
We will therefore control for regional states, as well as the municipalities’ population density
and broadband quality at the firm level, which both proxy for regional economic performance
at the most granular level. In addition, in a robustness check in the Appendix we show that
the main results hold in a fixed-effects model, where we control for time constant unobserved
heterogeneity between firms, such as location (see Table 21).
Table 10 displays the maximum funding rates for the funding period 2014-2020 as determined by
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the GRW region and SME status.21 For instance, a small firm located in a “D region” can apply
for a grant that amounts to 20% of the investment costs of the respective project. Funding rates
are higher for small enterprises in each region. Maximum funding rates range up to 40 % of the
eligible investment costs.
Table 10: Maximum incentive rates in the GRW Programme, in percentage of eligible investment costs
Region Small enterprise Medium enterprise Large enterprise
Border area 40 % 30 % 20 %
C region 30 % 20 % 10 %
D region 20 % 10 % 200.000 €
Note: The lowest maximum available funding rates in D regions are 20% for small- and 10% for medium sized
enterprises. For large enterprises this limit is set in an absolute value, 200.000 €.
Source: Deutscher Bundestag (2014).
In addition, the GRW also serves as a coordination framework for other policies in Germany, which
aim at supporting regional development. Thus, the same regions are addressed by the European
Regional Development Fund (ERDF), as well as the ERP Regional Promotion Programme by
the German government-owned development bank (KfW). We note that these two policies also
target investments, either through grants (ERDF) or through loans (ERP). Therefore, when we
simply explore regional variation in access to investment incentives, we capture these policies
along with GRW. In contrast, exploiting variation in the maximum funding rates is specific
to the GRW programme. We also note that other incentives for digitization projects, such as
consulting vouchers, typically do not overlap with the regions defined by GRW.
3.2.1 Empirical strategy
We use the regional variation in access to GRW funding to assess the relation between incentives
to invest and the adoption of cloud computing in firms. For each firm we determine whether
it had access to GRW funding based on its location and its SME status. Our main variable of
interest is a treatment dummy, which is equal to one if the firm had access to GRW funding
and zero otherwise, based on their location. Later on, we additionally exploit the variation in
maximum funding rates to analyse the relation not only at the extensive, but also at the intensive
margin.
As information on cloud computing is only available in two waves of the survey, the data has very
limited time-series coverage for our analysis. Since, in addition, the administrative ICT survey in
Germany is a rotating panel, we have only few firms, which we observe in the two years in which
the survey contains information on cloud use, 2014 and 2016. Therefore, for the main analysis
we resort to estimations based on a pooled cross section of all firms in the data. Due to the
cross-sectional nature of our main analysis, our results should be interpreted with caution. We
are only able to assess our research hypothesis by means of controlled correlations, even though
21See the EU recommendation 2003/361 (http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2003/361/oj): In particular, we will treat
firms with less than 50 employees and annual sales up to 10.000 € as small, firms with less than 250 employees
and sales up to 50.000 € as medium, and firms beyond as large firms.
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we are able to control for the most important confounders. In the Appendix, we additionally
show that our main results hold in a simple two period fixed effects regression, controlling for any
time-constant unobserved heterogeneity between firms. Nevertheless, the strength of our analysis
stems from the fact that we are able to assess our research question based on micro-level firm
data in two countries and under different policy settings. This enables us to assess the external
validity of each case study and shows whether or not the results substantiate each other.
We assess the relation of treatment and the adoption of cloud in the following regression model:
CCi = β0 + β1Treati + β2X
′
i + εi (2)
Where CCi is an indicator, which equals one if firm i uses cloud computing and zero otherwise.
The vector X ′i represents a number of firm characteristics which may also predict cloud use. In
order to control for the general ICT-intensity of the firm, we include the share of employees with
access to the internet and with access to the mobile internet. Consistent with the literature of
technology adoption, the model controls for firm age and size (measured by employment and
sales). As the implementation of GRW is determined by the firm’s location and firm size, we
additionally control for a full set of federal state dummies, a set of indicator variables which
denote the bandwidth of the firm’s internet access, as well as the population density in the
respective region. Since we estimate our model with a pooled cross-sectional sample for the years
2014 and 2016, we additionally include year effects. Finally, εi captures unobservables related
to the firm’s cloud adoption. As the dependent variable in our model is binary, we estimate
Equation (2) using logit models.
In addition to mere access to regional investment incentives, we also assess the extent to which
differences in the maximum share of investment costs funded by the GRW are associated with
cloud use. Therefore, in a second specification, we additionally exploit variation in these maximum
funding rates the firm has access to, thereby looking into investment incentives at the intensive
margin. The maximum funding rate is determined by the region as well as the firm’s SME status
according to Table 10. Consequently, maximum funding rates range from 0% to 40% and instead
of a binary treatment indicator, we construct a variable granti to take the value of the maximum
share of investment costs which the firm can apply for. The distribution of maximum intensities
over the firms in our sample is shown in Figure 6 in the Appendix. We also include the funding
rates in squared terms in order to allow for a more flexible relationship between GRW funding
rates and cloud adoption, such that funding rates can have a decreasing marginal effect on the
propensity to use cloud. Consequently, our model then changes to the following:
CCi = β0 + β1granti + β2grant2i + β3X
′
i + εi (3)
As the GRW also works as a framework for other policy instruments, the binary treatment
indicator in Equation (2) captures access to further policy programmes, such as the ERP Regional
Promotion Programme, while the maximum funding rates are specific to the GRW programme.
This means that both specifications are not directly comparable: In the specification including
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the treatment indicator, we assess the relation of cloud adoption with broader access to public
investment incentives, while the specification including the maximum funding rates is specific to
one single programme only.
3.2.2 German data
The econometric analysis here relies on a data set, which combines information from various
administrative sources. This includes administrative data for cloud adoption, which stem from the
Survey on ICT Usage and E-Commerce in Enterprises administered by Eurostat. These data are
therefore directly comparable to the UK data, as both are collected within the same framework
by the respective national statistical offices. In addition, we use the German administrative
business registry that contains additional information on firm characteristics. Finally, we rely on
policy data, which provides specifics about the context and eligibility of the GRW grant scheme.
The primary data source is administrative data on the use of cloud computing by firms. Under the
administration of Eurostat, information on cloud computing and other ICT variables is collected
by means of a business survey by each country annually by their office of national statistics, thus
resulting in reasonable consistency in terms of questions asked and technologies covered across
countries overtime. The German data set provided by the German Federal Statistical Office
(destatis) is called "Erhebung zur Nutzung von Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien
in Unternehmen” (henceforth ICT survey). Asides for Schivardi and Schmitz (2018), this paper
is among the first to exploit this data set for firm-level analyses. Information on cloud adoption
pertains to the years 2014 and 2016.
In order to locate firms in municipalities, we match the administrative ICT survey with the
German business registry (Unternehmensregister), which, in addition to regional identifiers,
contains information on the firms’ industry affiliation, sales, number of employees and firm age.
Data on the GRW programme has been acquired through the German Federal Office of Economic
Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) as well as the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs
and Energy (BMWi). The data contain information at the municipal level on whether or not a
municipality is eligible to GRW grants, maximum funding rates, and approved funding for the
years 2000 until present.
3.2.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 17 in the Appendix shows descriptive statistics of the pooled cross section that we will
rely on for the main analysis. Our sample comprises 9,885 observations on cloud computing
usage throughout Germany, out of which 5,391 firms are observed in 2014 and 4,494 firms are
observed in 2016. Cloud computing is used by 20% of the firms in the sample. Within the average
observation, 54.4% of the employees have access to the internet and 18.2% of the employees are
equipped with a mobile internet connection. Own IT-staff are employed by 49% of the firms. We




The following section presents the results of the econometric analysis of the relation between
access to the regionally targeted investment grants as determined by the GRW at the extensive
and intensive margin. The analysis first assesses the relation between cloud use and eligibility for
investment grants as well as the maximum funding rates the firm is able to apply for. Next, the
relation with the propensity to employ IT-staff is being analysed, in order to examine whether
investment incentives differentially affect cloud adoption and the general ICT intensity in the
firm. Afterwards, the analysis explores which specific cloud technologies are related to the firms’
access to investment incentives. Finally, the section looks into the relation between the use of
cloud computing and the firms’ use of big data analytics to substantiate the respective findings
for the UK. Additionally, in the Appendix we present robustness checks of our main findings by
means of two period fixed effects regressions.
We now move to the results of our econometric analysis. Table 11 shows the estimates of the
average marginal effects computed from our model according to Equation (2). In Column (1) we
estimate a parsimonious model in which we only include a full set of dummy variables for federal
states, industry and year. In Columns (2) and (3) we additionally include into our model the log
number of employees, as a control for firm size, as well as the log of sales. This considerably
reduces the measured relation between treatment status and cloud adoption. In addition, in
Column (4) we control for the firm’s use of internet based ICT by including the share of employees
with access to the internet in general and with access to the mobile internet. Furthermore, we
include the firm’s fixed-line internet quality by adding a set of dummy variables denoting internet
speed and account for the firm’s age in logarithmic terms as well as the population density in
the municipality. The last column additionally includes dummies for being a medium or large
enterprise in order to further isolate the impact of the public funding rather than being an SME.
In all specifications, we find a negative and statistically significant relation between access to
public investment incentives and the propensity to use cloud computing. Looking at Column (4)
as our preferred specification, we find that having access to investment incentives decreases the
propensity to use cloud computing by 2.1 percentage points. This effect is statistically significant
at the 10% level.
Looking at other variables in the model, we find that firm size is an important determinant
of cloud adoption. According to the estimates in Column (4), a one percent increase in the
number of employees is associated with a 4.7 percentage point increase in the propensity to adopt
cloud. Moreover, internet access is an important determinant for the use of cloud technologies.
Looking at Column (4) again, a one percent increase in the share of employees with access to the
internet relates to a 0.2 percentage point increase in the propensity to adopt cloud. Beyond the
general use of internet in the firm, a respective increase in the share of employees with access to
mobile internet technologies increases the likelihood to adopt cloud by 0.1 percentage points.
Furthermore, our estimation results underline the importance of internet quality for the use
of cloud technologies. We find statistically significant and positive effects for the indicators
denoting internet access with 2 Mbit/s and beyond. Interestingly, the effects get larger for higher
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bandwidth up to 30 Mbit/s while there is no increase in the effect when moving further to 100
Mbit/s. Overall, these results suggest that there is a decreasing return to internet speed in terms
of firms’ cloud adoption. In interpreting these results one has to keep in mind that the data refer
to the years 2014 and 2016. Finally, cloud adoption is more likely in younger firms as denoted by
the negative marginal effect of firm age on cloud adoption.
Table 11: Cloud computing and access to regional incentives - Logit regression - Average marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
treated -0.042*** -0.032*** -0.029** -0.021* -0.021*
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Log(employees) 0.058*** 0.033*** 0.047*** 0.048***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Log(sales) 0.025*** 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
% of employees with internet connection 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
% of employees with mobile internet connection 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Broadband speed
below 2Mbit/s 0.038 0.037
(0.031) (0.031)
between 2 Mbit/s and 10 Mbit/s 0.086*** 0.087***
(0.023) (0.023)
between 10 Mbit/s and 30 Mbit/s 0.109*** 0.109***
(0.023) (0.023)
between 30 Mbit/s and 100 Mbit/s 0.135*** 0.135***
(0.023) (0.023)











Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fed. State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo RˆSquared 0.033 0.077 0.082 0.116 0.116
Observations 9885 9885 9885 9885 9885
Log likelihood -4846.332 -4621.840 -4600.057 -4427.349 -4426.384
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include an intercept.
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In Table 12, we move on and exploit variation in the maximum GRW funding rates available to
the firm. Again, note that the treatment dummy from our first set of results captures access
to a multitude of regionally targeted public investment incentives besides the GRW, such as
the ERDF. In contrast, the maximum funding rates only refer to the GRW programme. The
columns in Table 12 replicate the specifications of our main results in Table 11, but instead of a
binary treatment indicator we include a continuous measure of the GRW funding rates available
to the firms as well as its squared term according to Equation (3).









Industry Effects Yes Yes
Fed. State Effects Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes
Pseudo RˆSquared 0.082 0.116
Observations 9885 9885
Log likelihood -4599.836 -4426.299
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include an intercept.
Controls include the share of employees working predominantly at PCs, the share of employees with internet
access, four indicators for broadband speed, firm age, regional population density and indicators for SME status.
In addition to the firms’ location, maximum GRW funding rates are also determined by the firms’
SME status. Therefore, in Column (5) of Table 11 we include indicators for the firms’ SME
status in addition to firm size as measured by the number of employees. Looking at the average
marginal effects, we again find a negative and statistically significant relationship between GRW
funding rates accessible to the firm and cloud adoption.
3.2.5 Relation of investment incentives and alternative ICT measures
Overall, our estimation results suggest a negative relationship between regional investment
incentives and the propensity to adopt cloud services at the extensive and intensive margin. We
now want to assess the relation of regional investment incentives with other ICT technologies.
Ideally, we would assess the relation with investments in physical (ICT) capital, as compared
to cloud services. Unfortunately, our data do not include investment information in general.
Moreover, the data only contain very few items which were asked in both years, 2014 and 2016,
and which we can thus use for our analysis. Among the very few items available in both waves, we
investigate the relationship with a binary variable whether or not the firm employs IT-staff. We
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regard the employment of IT-staff as a proxy for the firms’ investment in IT assets and on-premise
technologies (Xue, Ray, & Sambamurthy, 2012; Hitt & Brynjolfsson, 1996). Table 13 replicates
our main results, but assesses the relation between access to regional investment incentives and
the propensity to employ IT-staff. Once we control for the firms’ sales in logarithm and ICT
intensity by means of internet use, the estimated marginal effects are very small and insignificant.
Consequently, in contrast to the relation with cloud use, we do not find a significant relationship
between access to regional investment incentives and the propensity to employ IT-staff. This
strengthens our hypothesis that incentives for using cloud differ from incentives for IT investments
To sum up, exploiting variation in access to regionally targeted investment incentives in Germany
yields results in line with the findings from the UK case, which exploits investment incentives
through tax schemes. Having access to regionally targeted investment incentives is associated
with a decreased propensity to use cloud computing. In contrast, there is no significant relation
with the propensity to employ IT-staff, which serves as a proxy for investment in IT assets and
on-premise technologies.22
Table 13: Alternative ICT measure - Logit regression - Average marginal effects
IT-staff





Log(employees) 0.106*** 0.142*** 0.105*** 0.142***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(sales) 0.072*** 0.035*** 0.072*** 0.035***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fed. State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo RˆSquared 0.297 0.365 0.297 0.365
Observations 9885 9885 9885 9885
Log likelihood -4818.309 -4352.555 -4818.743 -4351.973
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include an intercept.
Controls include the share of employees working predominantly at PCs, the share of employees with internet
access, four indicators for broadband speed, firm age, regional population density and indicators for SME status.
3.2.6 Effect by different cloud technologies
In a next step, we exploit the fact that the data allow to look into different types of cloud
technologies which were already investigated above for the UK. In Table 18 and Table 19 in the
22Furthermore, we find no statistically significant effect of the investment scheme on firm size. This indicates that
we are not solely capturing laggard firms being less likely to purchase cloud services and further reassures our
findings.
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Appendix, we analyse the relation between these detailed cloud items and the firms’ treatment
status. However, we do not seem to have sufficient statistical power to obtain any statistically
significant coefficients. Therefore, in a next step we aggregate the detailed cloud measures
according to the two broader cloud measures as defined by Eurostat (see Table 4). Aggregating
the individual cloud technologies in this manner, we find that 7.7% of the firms in our sample
are users of basic cloud technologies in 2016, whereas 12% of the firms have adopted complex
cloud services by that time.
Replicating our analyses with these two aggregate cloud measures, we find that the negative
and statistically significant relation between treatment and cloud adoption only holds for basic
cloud technologies. As shown in Table 14, the regression results suggest that having access to
financial support is associated with a 1.3 percentage point decrease in the propensity to have such
technologies in place. The respective association with complex cloud technologies is considerably
smaller and thus statistically insignificant. These results also hold qualitatively for the maximum
funding rates (Columns 3-4). Investment incentives, especially within the scope of the GRW, are
primarily targeted towards new activities, in contrast to other programmes targeted towards
innovation and R&D. Therefore, they seem to affect only the use of those cloud technologies
which are the first to adopt when moving towards cloud. In contrast, they do not seem to affect
firms moving further to more complex cloud services.
Table 19 in the Appendix displays the full estimation results, since other variables in the
model also yield interesting patterns: Firm age is only significantly related with complex cloud
technologies, i.e. older firms are less likely to use these advanced technologies whereas for basic
cloud services, firm age is not a significant determining factor. Looking at bandwidth, the smallest
bandwidth (below two Mbit/s) already increases the propensity to use basic cloud technologies,
whereas for complex cloud technologies, only bandwidth beyond 2 Mbit/s starts to significantly
increase the propensity of using cloud. Sales are only significantly related to advanced cloud
technologies.
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Table 14: Access to regional incentives and basic- vs. complex cloud services – Average marginal effects





Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fed. State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo RˆSquared 0.043 0.113 0.044 0.113
Observations 9885 9885 9885 9885
Log likelihood -2237.561 -2846.910 -2236.714 -2846.999
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include an intercept.
Controls include the number of employees and total sales in logarithmic terms, share of employees working
predominantly at PCs, the share of employees with internet access, four indicators for broadband speed, firm age
in logarithmic terms, regional population density and indicators for SME status.
3.2.7 Cloud diffusion and big data analytics
Finally, we move on to assess the relation between the use of cloud computing and big data
analytics. Among the firms in our sample, around 11% rely on big data and related analytics to
support their business operations. In line with the previous analyses, we estimate the relation
between cloud and big data by means of simple logit regressions. The results in Table 15 indicate a
positive and statistically significant relation between the use of these two technologies. Controlling
for other firm characteristics, the use of cloud computing is associated with a 7.5 percentage point
increase in the likelihood to adopt big data (Column 2). Therefore, the results are qualitatively in
line with the analysis of UK firms, and support the notion that cloud computing is a prerequisite
of big data analytics practices. We note that, in comparison, the relation with other measures
for the firms ICT intensity, including the share of employees working with PCs and with access
to the internet, as well as broadband quality (excluded for brevity) is rather weak.
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Table 15: Cloud computing and big data analytics (BDA) - Average marginal effects
Overall Internal-only External-only External and internal
BDA BDA BDA BDA
cloud computing 0.075*** 0.055*** 0.036*** 0.074***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
Log(employees) 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.006 0.027***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Log(sales) 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
% of employees with 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000 0.000**
internet connection (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
% of employees with 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
mobile internet connection (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fed. State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo RˆSquared 0.113 0.141 0.115 0.127
Observations 4474 4474 4474 4474
Log likelihood -1338.602 -1090.346 -679.018 -1257.288
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include an intercept.
Controls include four indicators for broadband speed, firm age in logarithmic terms, regional population density
and indicators for SME status.
4 Summary of results in the UK and Germany
The substitution of traditional ICT with cloud is taking place quite rapidly, which is expected
to be important for firm competitiveness and productivity growth. However, the rates of cloud
adoption across countries is considerably different raising several issues regarding the appropriate
policy to enable cloud use. In fact, across many OECD countries, current and future proposed
policies target ICT investments and tangible investments in capital more generally rather than
digital services (OECD, 2019). Such policies may discourage firms from using cloud services,
which are typically regarded as important, particularly for young entrants given that many
non-cloud technologies are biased towards large incumbents. Cloud services on the other hand
can increase firm growth and productivity for young firms, which is relevant in light of the recent
slowdown of business dynamism.
This paper assesses the effects of two distinct capital incentive policies in the UK and Germany
on firm-level cloud adoption. For the UK, we find that the capital incentive policy led to an
increase in total capital and hardware capital investment. However, the results for both empirical
studies suggest that capital incentive policies are discouraging cloud adoption in the UK and
in Germany. These results suggest that various methods of capital incentive policies (in this
case tax allowances in the UK and grants for investments in Germany) consistently negatively
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predict the use of cloud services. This indicates that firms view ICT capital investment and
cloud adoption as substitutes. Therefore, a reduction in the price of ICT investment leads to a
substitution away from cloud and towards traditional ICT.
One of the motivations for conducting an empirical study on the determinants of cloud adoption
is that cloud computing is perceived to enable the adoption of new big data driven business
models. The results in this paper are consistent with this view as they find for firms in both
the UK and Germany, that cloud adoption is linked to a greater propensity in the use of big
data analytics. While these results are not causal and further research is needed in this area, it
does suggest that the adoption of cloud and the collection and use of data by firms goes hand in
hand. Therefore, by incentivising traditional forms of ICT, government policy may inadvertently
be slowing the diffusion of cloud with potential knock-on effects to further slow the diffusion of
other data-driven technologies that are leveraged by the cloud.
Our results present interesting insights that should be considered when designing policies for the
digital transformation. Most OECD countries currently have some form of a capital incentive
policy in place (many include or even explicitly target IT capital investments) and are therefore
similar in nature to the policies assessed in this paper (Tax Foundation, 2018).More generally,
the results suggest that policies designed for firms comprised of PCs, servers, bricks and mortar
may need reconsideration for business models that are increasingly comprise of intangibles.
Policy makers may therefore want to consider broadening these incentive schemes to include
digital services. At the same time, when unbundling the aggregate sum of ICT capital and
services within the firm, the rapid and continuous churning across technologies and services
becomes apparent (DeStefano, De Backer, & Moussiegt, 2017). This highlights the difficult job
policy makers face when choosing particular technologies to encourage and demonstrates the
need for constant adjustment of these programmes.
Finally, the analysis suggests that the availability of fast broadband is an important determinant
for cloud use. These results are consistent with evidence on the importance of broadband for
cloud but also for digital technologies in general (DeStefano, Kneller, & Timmis, 2019; DeStefano,
Kneller, & Timmis, 2018). Most OECD countries are providing considerable policy attention
towards rolling out more high quality broadband (OECD, 2015). At the same time, important
disparities exist in fibre broadband available across and within countries and this presents a
likely barrier to cloud adoption for firms that reside on the wrong side of the digital divide.
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Table 16: Summary statistics of the estimation sample for the UK
Variable Mean Standard deviation Observations
Cloud 0.381 0.486 4,678
Cloud Hardware 0.293 0.455 4,678
Cloud Processing 0.110 0.313 4,678
Cloud Storage 0.231 0.421 4,678
Cloud Data 0.173 0.379 4,678
Cloud Data/Storage 0.276 0.447 4,678
Cloud Software 0.273 0.446 4,678
Cloud CRM 0.126 0.332 4,678
Cloud finance software 0.078 0.268 4,678
Cloud Office Software 0.128 0.334 4,678
Cloud Email 0.183 0.387 4,678
Cloud Low-Tech 0.092 0.289 4,678
Cloud Med-Tech 0.173 0.379 4,678
Cloud High-Tech 0.211 0.408 4,678
Big data analytics 0.211 0.408 2,348
Big data analytics – internal only 0.119 0.324 2,348
Big data analytics – external only 0.016 0.126 2,348
Big data analytics – external and internal 0.076 0.265 2,348
Log(Total investment) 6.561 2.608 28,030
Log(IT acquisitions) 4.383 2.253 29,244
Log(Hardware acquisitions) 3.812 2.122 29,244
% PCs per employees 59.878 34.393 13,170
Log(Employees) 5.650 1.620 56,649
Log(Sales) 10.525 1.962 56,614
Log(Sales per worker) 4.863 1.620 56,614
Multi-plant 0.679 0.467 56,676
Number of plant 39.383 266.990 56,676
Foreign owned 0.284 0.451 56,676
Log(Age) 3.270 0.469 56,676
Urban 0.785 0.410 56,867
Young (<= 5 years) 0.017 0.130 56,676
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Granted Funds in Mio € Number of GRW Cases
Note: Left scale: Granted funds in Mio € (blue). Right scale: Number of GRW cases (red).
Illustrated is the number of GRW cases as well as the total sum of GRW grants awarded by year. There has been
a steady decline in total grants and the number of GRW cases from 2000 to 2015. However, both figures recovered
from 2015 on.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on BAFA (2019).
Table 17: Summary statistics of the estimation sample for Germany
Variable Mean Standard deviation Observations
Number of employees 433 4220.20 9,885
Sales in Mio € 140.5 2175.70 9,885
Firm age 28.4 22.70 9,885
% of employees with internet connection 54.4 33.50 9,885
% of employees with mobile internet connection 18.2 22.70 9,885
Cloud 0.20 0.40 9,885
Employment of own IT-staff 0.49 0.50 9,885
Population density 1.13 1.08 9,885
Eligibility for GRW funding 0.35 0.48 9,885
Broadband speed
below 2Mbit/s 0.042 0.20 9,885
between 2 Mbit/s and 10 Mbit/s 0.26 0.44 9,885
between 10 Mbit/s and 30 Mbit/s 0.27 0.44 9,885
between 30 Mbit/s and 100 Mbit/s 0.21 0.41 9,885
more than 100 Mbit/s 0.18 0.39 9,885
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Note: This figure shows the distribution of the maximum funding rates of the GRW as determined by location
and firm size over the firms in the sample. For the empirical analysis, the maximum funding of 200.000 € for large
enterprises (compare to Table 10) is coded as an incentive rate of 5%.
Source: Own illustration by authors based on ICT survey and BAFA (2019).
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Table 18: Access to regional incentives and different types of cloud adoption – Average marginal effects
Cloud Cloud Cloud Cloud Cloud Cloud Cloud
Email finance software processing CRM office software storage of files hosting the enterprise’s
database(s)
treated -0.173 -0.079 -0.241 0.230 -0.009 -0.103 0.073
(0.125) (0.169) (0.158) (0.174) (0.158) (0.113) (0.143)
Log(employees) 0.159*** 0.027 0.203*** 0.214*** 0.317*** 0.198*** 0.233***
(0.055) (0.068) (0.066) (0.070) (0.067) (0.048) (0.060)
Log(sales) 0.019 0.107** 0.005 -0.007 0.036 0.035 0.014
(0.038) (0.051) (0.045) (0.050) (0.051) (0.034) (0.043)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fed. State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo RˆSquared 0.052 0.054 0.094 0.132 0.132 0.102 0.084
Observations 9858 9855 9857 9796 9843 9855 9810
Log likelihood -2599.875 -1842.682 -1798.119 -1610.928 -1704.195 -3069.054 -2078.559
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include an intercept. Controls include the share of employees working predominantly
at PCs, the share of employees with internet access, four indicators for broadband speed, firm age, regional population density and indicators for SME status.
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Table 19: Access to regional incentives and basic- vs. complex cloud services – Average marginal effects –
Full estimation results
Basic Complex Basic Complex





Log(employees) 0.008** 0.019*** 0.003 0.005*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Log(sales) 0.003 0.005* 0.008** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
% of employees with internet connection 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
% of employees with mobile internet connection 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Broadband speed
below 2Mbit/s 0.033* 0.006 0.033* 0.006
(0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020)
between 2 Mbit/s and 10 Mbit/s 0.038*** 0.051*** 0.038*** 0.051***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015)
between 10 Mbit/s and 30 Mbit/s 0.045*** 0.060*** 0.045*** 0.060***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015)
between 30 Mbit/s and 100 Mbit/s 0.052*** 0.079*** 0.052*** 0.079***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.015)
more than 100 Mbit/s 0.036*** 0.074*** 0.036*** 0.073***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016)
Log(age) 0.000 -0.017*** 0.000 -0.017***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
population density 0.000 0.009** 0.000 0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
SME Status
medium -0.006 0.003 -0.005 0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
large 0.004 -0.002 0.005 -0.003
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015)
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fed. State Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo RˆSquared 0.043 0.113 0.044 0.113
Observations 9885 9885 9885 9885
Log likelihood -2237.561 -2846.910 -2236.714 -2846.999
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models include an intercept.
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Panel data analysis
As the German administrative ICT survey is a rotating panel, we only observe a small fraction
of the firms in both waves. In addition, most of the variables in our model exhibit very little
within-variation, which additionally mitigates the scope to identify parameters of interest within a
fixed effects estimation. Nevertheless, as a robustness check we perform a fixed effects regressions
with the sample of firms which we observe in both waves. For these firms there is no change in
the treatment status between 2014 and 2016. However, we exploit the fact that GRW regions
were newly assigned in 2014 and therefore treatment status changed for some firms between 2013
and 2014. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the regions eligible for GRW funding under the scheme
which was in place form 2007 until 2013 (left hand side) and the current one, which came into
place in 2014 (right hand side).
Figure 7: GRW eligible regions 2007-2013 Figure 8: GRW eligible regions since 2014
Source: Authors’ calculation based on BAFA (Federal Office of Economic Affairs and Export Control, 2019).
Table 20 displays that out of 1,276 firms we retain in the balanced panel, 24 % lost access to
GRW investment incentives and 6 % gained access.
Table 20: Change in treatment status





Note: Authors’ calculation based on BAFA (Federal Office of Economic Affairs and Export Control, 2019).
In order to exploit this variation in treatment status we estimate the following fixed effects linear
probability model (see Equation (4)).
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CCit = β0 + β1Treati,t−1+β2X
′
it + µi + εit (4)
We now consider lagged treatment status, which is necessary to gain variation in treatment status
within firms over time for the survey years 2014 and 2016, as the status in t-1 for 2014 refers
to the previous GRW funding period (see Figure 6 and Figure 7). Note that in the estimation
we consider all firms, those who gained access to funding, those who lost access to funding, and
those for whom treatment status did not change. In addition, X ′it is a vector of time-varying firm
characteristics and µi denotes the firm fixed effect, which captures any time-constant, unobserved
heterogeneity between firms, such as any region specific characteristics. Table 21 Columns 1-3
show that the negative relation between treatment status and the propensity to adopt cloud
computing remains robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects. However, any other estimates
become insignificant, reflecting the little variation in variables within firms over time. Therefore,
our panel estimations need to be taken with a grain of salt. Still, the results increase the
confidence in the results we obtain from the pooled cross section.
In Columns 4-6 of Table 21 we also look into the relation between the treatment status and
the propensity to employ own IT-staff within a fixed effects panel regression. Analogous to the
results in the cross section, we find that, in contrast to the propensity to use cloud, treatment is
positive yet statistically insignificantly related to employing IT-staff. The findings of a differential
effect of investment incentives on cloud adoption versus employment of IT-staff, as a proxy for
general ICT investments, also hold when we rely on the continuous maximum funding rates in
the panel estimations (results excluded for brevity). The regression results furthermore suggest
that firm size and the share of employees with access to the internet is positively related to the
propensity to employ own IT-staff.
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Table 21: Access to regional incentives - Panel fixed effects estimation
Cloud computing IT-staff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treated-1 -0.049** -0.049** -0.046** 0.017 0.018 0.025
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Log(employees) 0.036 0.038 0.037* 0.039**
(0.034) (0.036) (0.020) (0.020)
Log(sales) -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
% of employees with internet connection 0.000 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001)
% of employees with mobile internet connection 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Broadband speed
below 2Mbit/s -0.009 0.070
(0.073) (0.072)
between 2 Mbit/s and 10 Mbit/s 0.019 0.018
(0.062) (0.051)
between 10 Mbit/s and 30 Mbit/s 0.002 0.056
(0.063) (0.053)
between 30 Mbit/s and 100 Mbit/s 0.024 0.082
(0.063) (0.055)
more than 100 Mbit/s 0.050 0.054
(0.067) (0.057)
Constant 0.248*** 0.085 0.053 0.663*** 0.517*** 0.403***
(0.005) (0.181) (0.205) (0.004) (0.128) (0.154)
Observations 2452 2452 2452 2452 2452 2452
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All columns show the estimation results of a panel fixed effects linear probability model.
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